fix(security): pin GitHub Actions to commit SHAs in CI/publish workflow#198
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XananasX7 wants to merge 1 commit into
Open
fix(security): pin GitHub Actions to commit SHAs in CI/publish workflow#198XananasX7 wants to merge 1 commit into
XananasX7 wants to merge 1 commit into
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Tag-pinned actions (including etils-actions/pypi-auto-publish@v1) can be silently redirected to malicious code. Pinning to SHA hashes ensures the action code is immutable and tamper-proof, preventing supply-chain attacks via `PYPI_API_TOKEN`.
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Summary
This workflow uses mutable tag references for GitHub Actions, including
etils-actions/pypi-auto-publish@v1— a third-party action. If the tag is silently redirected (compromised maintainer, repo takeover, tag deletion/recreation), malicious code runs in the job that holdsPYPI_API_TOKEN, enabling a backdoored PyPI release and a supply-chain attack on downstream users.Changes
All action references pinned to immutable commit SHAs (with tag preserved as comment for readability):
actions/checkout@v4→ SHA-pinnedactions/setup-python@v5→ SHA-pinnedetils-actions/pypi-auto-publish@v1→@e3c4b4afc3a5b12a44734da938741995538e8223styfle/cancel-workflow-action@0.7.0→ SHA-pinned (where applicable)This follows the GitHub security hardening guide.