Prototype runner-wide network policies - #802
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The domain policies in
agents/codex/config.tomlonly constrain Codex processes, while other CI tools and action hooks can still make unrestricted network requests. This adds an early-job proxy prototype that imports those rules, combines them with reviewed per-job service lists, and applies a default-deny network policy to disposable Linux runners.The action redirects DNS, HTTP, and HTTPS through a root-owned policy service, rejects other external and forwarded traffic, and can remove sudo and container-daemon access before later action hooks. HTTPS remains end-to-end encrypted. The first rollout candidates are formatting, linting, and lockfile checks; normal workflows are not changed yet. Privileged jobs, unsupported runner types, traffic before the first
prehook, and application-level access through allowed hosts remain explicit limits.