Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security reports.

Email siddhesh.kabraa@gmail.com with the subject line [ide-bridge security] <short summary>. Include:

• A description of the vulnerability
• Steps to reproduce
• Potential impact
• Any suggested mitigations

You should receive an acknowledgement within 3 business days. Coordinated disclosure: please give us 90 days to ship a fix before public disclosure, unless the issue is being actively exploited.

In scope:

• The ide-bridge daemon and its MCP tool surface
• The ide-bridge CLI
• Dependency vulnerabilities that impact a default install

Out of scope:

• Issues in upstream agentic IDEs (Claude Code, Cursor, Kiro, Antigravity)
• Social-engineering against maintainers
• Denial-of-service requiring local admin privileges (the daemon runs as an unprivileged local user by design)

• Daemon binds 127.0.0.1 only — no remote network surface
• Storage under ~/.ide-bridge/ with permissions 0o700 (dirs) / 0o600 (files)
• Request bodies capped at 10 MB
• project_id inputs validated against ^[A-Za-z0-9._\-]{1,128}$
• metadata merges filter __proto__ / constructor / prototype keys to prevent prototype pollution

Known gaps (tracked for v0.1.x):

• No redaction of secrets that agents may paste into prompts (warnings planned — spec §12)
• get_project_id(cwd) trusts caller-supplied cwd — a local hostile process can probe filesystem layout
• No per-project LRU on the debouncer Map

Thank you for helping keep the project safe.