IBM MQ MCP Server connects to IBM MQ queue managers, enforces per-profile capabilities, and may handle credentials and message payloads. Security is a first-class concern.

Threat-model and assurance documentation grow with DOC-001; architectural boundaries live under docs/architecture/ and docs/adr/.

Please report suspected vulnerabilities privately — do not open a public issue for security problems.

• Use GitHub Security Advisories ("Report a vulnerability") on this repository, or email konrad.heimel@gmail.com privately.
• Include affected version/commit, a description, reproduction steps, and impact.
• You will receive an acknowledgement; fixes for confirmed issues are prioritised and disclosed once a fix is available.

This is a personal project without a formal SLA, but security reports are taken seriously and handled promptly.

The project is pre-1.0. Only the latest released version and the default branch receive fixes. Public contracts may change between pre-1.0 releases.

• Deny by default: capabilities not explicitly granted are rejected locally before downstream IBM MQ I/O.
• Profile trust boundary: every queue-manager profile is an independent policy, credential, and audit unit.
• No credential leakage: secrets stay out of configuration values that are logged, tool results, and error strings.
• Typed operations: prefer schema-backed tools over arbitrary MQSC; raw MQSC (if ever enabled) is an exceptional, separately gated capability (ADR-0008).
• Supply chain: pinned CI action SHAs, committed lockfiles when Go exists, secret scanning, CodeQL (after FND-001), OpenSSF Scorecard, and release image signing with cosign + SBOM/provenance (FND-003, pattern from Kollect/MKurator).

• CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md — community behavior standards
• GOVERNANCE.md — roles, decision making, security contact
• CONTRIBUTING.md — how to contribute (includes DCO)
• SUPPORT.md — where to get help