Please do not open a public issue for security problems.

Use GitHub's private reporting: Security → Report a vulnerability on this repository. That reaches the maintainer privately and gives us a place to coordinate a fix.

Expect a first response within a week. If a fix is warranted it ships in the next release, and you get credit in the changelog unless you would rather not.

This extension handles text people paste, select, or upload, and optionally an API key. The things most worth reporting:

• Text reaching a network on the default path. The extension is supposed to run entirely on device unless the user configures their own API key. Any path that sends text somewhere else is a serious bug.
• The sensitive-field guard being bypassed. Password, card number, and one-time-code fields must never be captured, through either entry point (right click or keyboard shortcut). The guard lives in the content script, so any path that reads a selection without waiting for that script to answer is a bypass.
• The per-site switch being bypassed. On a site the user has turned off, nothing may be read from the page at all.
• API key exposure. Keys live in chrome.storage.local, are never synced, and must never appear in a log, an error message, or a request to anywhere other than the endpoint the user configured.
• Page text being modified without consent. Apply must never write over text it cannot verify, and must relocate or refuse rather than guess.
• Malicious file handling. The .docx reader parses untrusted archives by hand. Crashes, hangs, or resource exhaustion from a crafted file are in scope.

• The quality of a rewrite, or whether some AI detector flags the output. This extension does not claim to defeat detectors.
• Behavior of a third-party API endpoint a user configures themselves.
• Sites where the extension cannot work by design (canvas editors such as Google Docs, cross-origin iframes, shadow DOM editors). These are documented limitations, not vulnerabilities.

A selection inside a cross-origin iframe is read through Chrome's own copy of the selected text, because the content script runs in the top frame and cannot see into the child document. That means the credential guard, which inspects the focused element, cannot inspect a field in that iframe. A payment field hosted in a third-party iframe is therefore not covered by that guard. Closing this needs the content script injected into every frame, which changes how a selection is resolved; it is tracked rather than fixed. Do not select text in an embedded payment form.

The latest release on main is supported. This is a young project; older versions are not patched.