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14 changes: 7 additions & 7 deletions crosswalk/agentic-top10/Agentic_MITREATLAS.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -28,11 +28,11 @@ the severity of a technique beyond its baseline LLM rating.
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ASI01 | Agent Goal Hijack | Critical | AML.T0051.000, AML.T0051.001, AML.T0054 | Autonomy turns single injection into multi-step attack chain | Foundational–Advanced |
| ASI02 | Tool Misuse & Exploitation | Critical | AML.T0037, AML.T0015, AML.T0068 | Tool access converts prompt manipulation into real-world action | Foundational–Advanced |
| ASI03 | Identity & Privilege Abuse | Critical | AML.T0022, AML.T0016, AML.T0024 | Cached credentials give attacker persistent access beyond session | Foundational–Advanced |
| ASI03 | Identity & Privilege Abuse | Critical | AML.T0012, AML.T0024, AML.T0024 | Cached credentials give attacker persistent access beyond session | Foundational–Advanced |
| ASI04 | Agentic Supply Chain | High | AML.T0056, AML.T0048, AML.T0010 | Runtime dynamic loading means poisoned components affect all consumers | Hardening–Advanced |
| ASI05 | Unexpected Code Execution | Critical | AML.T0040, AML.T0054, AML.T0037 | Code generation + execution capability creates RCE gateway | Foundational–Advanced |
| ASI06 | Memory & Context Poisoning | High | AML.T0032, AML.T0063, AML.T0020 | Persistence across sessions amplifies impact of single injection | Hardening–Advanced |
| ASI07 | Insecure Inter-Agent Comms | High | AML.T0043, AML.T0022, AML.T0016 | A2A spoofing misdirects entire agent clusters | Hardening–Advanced |
| ASI07 | Insecure Inter-Agent Comms | High | AML.T0043, AML.T0012, AML.T0024 | A2A spoofing misdirects entire agent clusters | Hardening–Advanced |
| ASI08 | Cascading Agent Failures | High | AML.T0029, AML.T0034, AML.T0057 | Single fault fans out across all downstream agents | Foundational–Advanced |
| ASI09 | Human-Agent Trust Exploitation | Medium | AML.T0045, AML.T0047, AML.T0049 | Agent fluency makes manipulation invisible to audit logs | Foundational–Hardening |
| ASI10 | Rogue Agents | Critical | AML.T0054, AML.T0015, AML.T0057 | Compliant surface masks persistent hidden goal pursuit | Hardening–Advanced |
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -204,8 +204,8 @@ the original session ends.

| Technique | ID | Tactic | Agentic context |
|---|---|---|---|
| Valid Accounts | [AML.T0022](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0022) | Initial Access / Persistence | Exploiting legitimate agent credentials to access AI systems or data pipelines |
| Exfiltration via AI Inference API | [AML.T0016](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0016) | Exfiltration | Using compromised agent credentials to exfiltrate data through inference API |
| Valid Accounts | [AML.T0012](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0012) | Initial Access / Persistence | Exploiting legitimate agent credentials to access AI systems or data pipelines |
| Exfiltration via AI Inference API | [AML.T0024](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0024) | Exfiltration | Using compromised agent credentials to exfiltrate data through inference API |
| Model Inversion | [AML.T0024](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0024) | Collection | Reconstructing sensitive data accessible to the agent through credential abuse |

#### Mitigations by tier
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -460,8 +460,8 @@ cluster.
| Technique | ID | Tactic | Agentic context |
|---|---|---|---|
| Network Service Scanning | [AML.T0043](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0043) | Discovery | Identifying and mapping inter-agent communication endpoints for targeting |
| Valid Accounts | [AML.T0022](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0022) | Persistence | Using compromised agent credentials to impersonate trusted agents in A2A channels |
| Exfiltration via AI Inference API | [AML.T0016](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0016) | Exfiltration | Intercepting inter-agent messages to exfiltrate sensitive context passed between agents |
| Valid Accounts | [AML.T0012](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0012) | Persistence | Using compromised agent credentials to impersonate trusted agents in A2A channels |
| Exfiltration via AI Inference API | [AML.T0024](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0024) | Exfiltration | Intercepting inter-agent messages to exfiltrate sensitive context passed between agents |

#### Mitigations by tier

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ crosswalks for OT-specific controls.

| Technique | ID | Tactic | Agentic context |
|---|---|---|---|
| Denial of ML Service | [AML.T0029](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0029) | Impact | Triggering cascading failure propagation to exhaust system resources or degrade service |
| Denial of AI Service | [AML.T0029](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0029) | Impact | Triggering cascading failure propagation to exhaust system resources or degrade service |
| Cost Harvesting | [AML.T0034](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0034) | Impact | Crafting inputs that trigger runaway agent loops generating unbounded costs |
| Exploit Public-Facing ML Application | [AML.T0057](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0057) | Initial Access | Exploiting an exposed agent endpoint to introduce a fault that cascades internally |

Expand Down
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