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Security: Back-Road-Creative/claude-batch-runner

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported versions

Only the latest released tag receives fixes. Pin a released v* tag; main is unstable.

Reporting a vulnerability

Please report suspected vulnerabilities privately. Do not open a public issue for a security report.

  • Open a private advisory via GitHub's Security → Report a vulnerability tab on this repository (Private Vulnerability Reporting).
  • If that tab is unavailable to you, contact the maintainer through the address in this project's package metadata (pyproject.toml), with claude-batch-runner security in the subject.

Please include the affected version or commit, a description of the issue and its impact, reproduction steps, and any suggested remediation.

What to expect

  • Acknowledgement within 5 business days.
  • An initial assessment and severity triage within 10 business days.
  • Coordinated disclosure: we agree a timeline with you before any public write-up, and credit reporters who want it.

Scope and threat model

In scope: the code under claude_batch_runner/ and the CI workflow under .github/workflows/.

Two things are worth stating plainly, because they shape what counts as a vulnerability here:

This library executes a subprocess you configure. A campaign spec names an agent and supplies a prompt; the runner passes both to the claude CLI. A spec is therefore as trusted as a script — do not run a campaign spec, worklist, or rubric from an untrusted source. Treat "a malicious spec causes a malicious agent invocation" as working as designed, not as a vulnerability.

Content flowing through the runner is framed as data, not instructions. Worker output, work units, and failed criteria are wrapped in an explicit data-only frame before they reach a grader or advisor (claude_batch_runner.verify.frame). This reduces the chance that text inside a reviewed artifact steers the model reviewing it. It is a mitigation, not a guarantee — no prompt-level framing is one. A framing bypass that reliably makes a grader follow instructions from graded content is in scope, and worth reporting.

Out of scope: vulnerabilities in the claude CLI itself (report those to its maintainers), and the content of whatever a model produces when you run a campaign.

There aren't any published security advisories