objectstack-ai
diff --git a/‎.changeset/per-organization-rbac-catalog.md‎
Lines changed: 70 additions & 0 deletions b/‎.changeset/per-organization-rbac-catalog.md‎
Lines changed: 70 additions & 0 deletions
diff --git a/‎packages/core/src/security/resolve-authz-context.ts‎
Lines changed: 42 additions & 3 deletions b/‎packages/core/src/security/resolve-authz-context.ts‎
Lines changed: 42 additions & 3 deletions
diff --git a/‎packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/bootstrap-builtin-positions.ts‎
Lines changed: 61 additions & 17 deletions b/‎packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/bootstrap-builtin-positions.ts‎
Lines changed: 61 additions & 17 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+---
+"@objectstack/plugin-security": minor
+"@objectstack/plugin-sharing": minor
+"@objectstack/core": patch
+---
+
+Materialize the RBAC catalog **per organization**, so a walled deployment can
+administer positions, permission sets and sharing rules again (#10103).
+
+On a walled deployment (`group` / `isolated`) every principal — an organization
+owner and a platform admin alike — listed **zero** positions, permission sets
+and sharing rules while the tables held rows. Nothing could be bound through
+Setup, and a declared `hierarchy-security` could never be armed by an operator
+however loudly an app declared it.
+
+Every row in those three tables was organization-less. plugin-security's Layer 0
+composes a strict `organization_id = :tenant` for a walled posture and the
+middleware ANDs it into the read AST over the driver's
+`(organization_id = :tenant OR organization_id IS NULL)`; the conjunction of the
+two is the strict equality alone, so the driver's null arm was annihilated on
+every authenticated read.
+
+**The wall is not changed, at either layer.** The rows get an owner instead:
+
+- `bootstrapDeclaredPositions`, `bootstrapBuiltinRoles`,
+  `bootstrapDeclaredPermissions` (plugin-security) and
+  `bootstrapDeclaredSharingRules` (plugin-sharing) upsert by
+  `(name, organization_id)` and run **one pass per organization** under a walled
+  posture — the framework built-ins (`platform_admin`, `org_*`, `everyone`,
+  `guest`) included, matching `sys_user_position`, which is already
+  per-organization, and matching both objects' own `unique: 'organization'` name
+  index.
+- Seeding also fires on **organization creation**, not only at `kernel:ready`, so
+  a tenant created after startup does not administer an empty catalog until the
+  next restart.
+- `single` posture is **unchanged**: exactly one organization-less pass, which is
+  the correct shape there.
+
+An organization-less row is now invalid state under a walled posture. Nothing is
+reaped — grants (`sys_user_position`, `sys_position_permission_set`,
+`sys_user_permission_set`, `sys_record_share`) point at these rows by id, so
+deleting them would revoke standing access with no signal at the moment of loss.
+Instead a per-organization pass that meets pre-fix organization-less rows for
+names it seeds **says so loudly**, naming the rows and the remedy, and still
+creates that organization's own copies. The failure this closes is the silent
+no-op: a tenant-threaded pass that sees the old row through the driver's
+compatibility arm, reads the name as already represented, and creates nothing
+while reporting success.
+
+Two enforcement-plane reads are scoped in the same change, because the exposure
+they carry only exists once per-organization copies exist:
+
+- `resolveUserAuthzContext`'s position name-sweep (`@objectstack/core`) resolved
+  `sys_position` by name across **every** organization, so the junction read
+  behind it collected another organization's `everyone` binding — a cross-organization
+  grant bleed, and an O(organizations) read on the per-request path. It is now
+  threaded through the driver's tenant chokepoint, keeping per-request resolution
+  O(the caller's own organization's catalog).
+- plugin-security's permission-set `dbLoader` resolved sets by name unscoped,
+  with a `limit` equal to the number of names — correct while one row existed per
+  name, a truncation the moment copies exist. It is now scoped to the caller's
+  organization and its bound widened.
+
+Boot reconciliation is O(changed declarations): each pass reads what its
+organization already has and writes only where a declaration actually differs, so
+the common boot performs no writes at all. Steady state rides the
+organization-creation hook.
+
+Cross-links #10119 / PR #10422, whose criteria-sweep scoping makes per-organization
+sharing rules cheaper than the unscoped sweep they replace.
@@ -118,10 +118,25 @@ function safeJsonParse<T>(s: string, fallback: T): T {
   try { return JSON.parse(s) as T; } catch { return fallback; }
 }
 
-async function tryFind(ql: any, object: string, where: any, limit = 100): Promise<any[]> {
+async function tryFind(
+  ql: any,
+  object: string,
+  where: any,
+  limit = 100,
+  /**
+   * Resolve inside ONE organization. Threaded into the execution context, so
+   * the read routes through `SqlDriver.applyTenantScope` — the governed
+   * chokepoint — rather than being re-implemented here as a bare equality.
+   * Omitted keeps the pre-existing installation-wide read, which is what the
+   * user-keyed reads above want (they are already narrowed by `user_id`) and
+   * what a `single`-posture deployment wants everywhere.
+   */
+  organizationId?: string,
+): Promise<any[]> {
   if (!ql || typeof ql.find !== 'function') return [];
   try {
-    let rows = await ql.find(object, { where, limit, context: { isSystem: true } } as any);
+    const context = organizationId ? { isSystem: true, tenantId: organizationId } : { isSystem: true };
+    let rows = await ql.find(object, { where, limit, context } as any);
     if (rows && (rows as any).value) rows = (rows as any).value;
     return Array.isArray(rows) ? rows : [];
   } catch {
@@ -462,7 +477,31 @@ export async function resolveUserAuthzGrants(
   //     with no `sys_position` row at all (`org_owner`, a membership-derived
   //     role) has no flag to read and is untouched.
   if (grants.positions.length > 0) {
-    const positionRows = await tryFind(ql, 'sys_position', { name: { $in: grants.positions } }, 100);
+    //     [#10103] Scoped to the CALLER's organization. `sys_position` spells
+    //     its name index `unique: 'organization'` and its rows are materialized
+    //     per organization, so several organizations hold a row named
+    //     `everyone` (and one named after every declared position). Swept by
+    //     name alone, this read returned EVERY organization's rows, and the
+    //     junction read below then collected another organization's bindings —
+    //     a cross-organization grant bleed, measured reachable from one tenant's
+    //     resolution to another tenant's `everyone` binding. It also made the
+    //     sweep O(organizations) on a table that is read on every request.
+    //
+    //     Scoped by threading the organization into the context rather than by
+    //     adding an `organization_id` predicate here: the driver's
+    //     `applyTenantScope` is the one governed spelling of this wall, and a
+    //     bare equality written at this call site would be a second, ungoverned
+    //     implementation of it — the exact shape that produced the defect this
+    //     card repairs. Per-request cost stays O(the caller's own organization's
+    //     catalog).
+    //
+    //     Limit raised with it: the cap has to admit this organization's rows
+    //     alongside any organization-less ones the driver's compatibility arm
+    //     still returns, or a caller silently loses positions. Those
+    //     organization-less rows stay REACHABLE on purpose — they are not
+    //     reaped, and grants point at them by row id, so dropping them here
+    //     would revoke standing access silently.
+    const positionRows = await tryFind(ql, 'sys_position', { name: { $in: grants.positions } }, 200, tenantId);
     const deactivatedNames = new Set<string>(
       positionRows.filter((r) => !isRowActive(r)).map((r) => r.name).filter(Boolean),
     );
 
@@ -12,13 +12,35 @@
  * `sys_member.role` for the org_* roles and the unscoped `admin_full_access`
  * grant for platform_admin — are NEVER changed by this seed.
  *
- * Idempotent upsert-by-name, no prune. Rows are stamped `managed_by = 'platform'`
- * (A4 #2920 unified vocab; formerly 'system') so tenants can see (but not
- * repurpose) them. Runs on `kernel:ready` alongside the platform-admin and
- * declared-role bootstraps.
+ * Idempotent upsert by `(name, organization_id)`, no prune. Rows are stamped
+ * `managed_by = 'platform'` (A4 #2920 unified vocab; formerly 'system') so
+ * tenants can see (but not repurpose) them. Runs on `kernel:ready` alongside the
+ * platform-admin and declared-role bootstraps, and again for each organization
+ * as it is created.
+ *
+ * ## Per organization under a walled posture
+ *
+ * The built-in names are seeded PER ORGANIZATION, copies and all. That is the
+ * ruled reading of what these rows are: `sys_position` spells its name index
+ * `unique: 'organization'`, `sys_user_position` assignments are already
+ * per-organization, and a walled tenant that cannot SEE `everyone` cannot bind
+ * anything to it. What is not copied is the SOURCE OF TRUTH behind the names —
+ * `sys_member.role` for the org_* roles and the unscoped `admin_full_access`
+ * grant for `platform_admin` — exactly as before: this seed remains a catalog
+ * projection, so per-organization copies of the catalog change no derivation.
+ *
+ * A `single`-posture deployment keeps exactly one organization-less pass. See
+ * `per-organization-catalog.ts` for the doctrine and for the loud guard that
+ * stands in place of a reap.
  */
 
 import { BUILTIN_IDENTITY_NAMES, BUILTIN_IDENTITY_METADATA, EVERYONE_POSITION, GUEST_POSITION } from '@objectstack/spec';
+import {
+  resolveOwnOrganizationRow,
+  rowMatchesDeclaration,
+  seedCtx,
+  warnPreFixOrganizationLessRows,
+} from './per-organization-catalog.js';
 
 /**
  * [ADR-0090 D5/D9] Audience anchors seeded alongside the identity names.
@@ -39,29 +61,32 @@ const AUDIENCE_ANCHOR_METADATA: Record<string, { label: string; description: str
   },
 };
 
-const SYSTEM_CTX = { isSystem: true };
-
 function genId(prefix: string): string {
   const rand = Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10);
   const ts = Date.now().toString(36);
   return `${prefix}_${ts}${rand}`;
 }
 
-async function tryFind(ql: any, object: string, where: any, limit = 100): Promise<any[]> {
+async function tryFind(ql: any, object: string, where: any, limit = 100, organizationId?: string): Promise<any[]> {
   try {
-    const rows = await ql.find(object, { where, limit }, { context: SYSTEM_CTX });
+    const rows = await ql.find(object, { where, limit }, { context: seedCtx(organizationId) });
     return Array.isArray(rows) ? rows : [];
   } catch { return []; }
 }
-async function tryInsert(ql: any, object: string, data: any): Promise<any | null> {
-  try { return await ql.insert(object, data, { context: SYSTEM_CTX }); } catch { return null; }
+async function tryInsert(ql: any, object: string, data: any, organizationId?: string): Promise<any | null> {
+  try { return await ql.insert(object, data, { context: seedCtx(organizationId) }); } catch { return null; }
 }
-async function tryUpdate(ql: any, object: string, data: any): Promise<boolean> {
-  try { await ql.update(object, data, { context: SYSTEM_CTX }); return true; } catch { return false; }
+async function tryUpdate(ql: any, object: string, data: any, organizationId?: string): Promise<boolean> {
+  try { await ql.update(object, data, { context: seedCtx(organizationId) }); return true; } catch { return false; }
 }
 
 interface SeedOptions {
   logger?: { info: (m: string, meta?: Record<string, any>) => void; warn: (m: string, meta?: Record<string, any>) => void };
+  /**
+   * Seed THIS organization's copies. Omitted = the `single`-posture pass, the
+   * one place an organization-less catalog row is the correct shape.
+   */
+  organizationId?: string;
 }
 
 export async function bootstrapBuiltinRoles(
@@ -71,8 +96,11 @@ export async function bootstrapBuiltinRoles(
   if (!ql || typeof ql.find !== 'function' || typeof ql.insert !== 'function') {
     return { seeded: 0, updated: 0 };
   }
+  const organizationId = options.organizationId;
   let seeded = 0;
   let updated = 0;
+  let unchanged = 0;
+  const residue: string[] = [];
   const rows: Array<[string, { label: string; description: string }]> = [
     ...BUILTIN_IDENTITY_NAMES.map((n) => [n, BUILTIN_IDENTITY_METADATA[n]] as [string, { label: string; description: string }]),
     ...Object.entries(AUDIENCE_ANCHOR_METADATA),
@@ -82,16 +110,32 @@ export async function bootstrapBuiltinRoles(
     // PLATFORM-shipped (formerly stamped 'system'). Re-upserted every boot, so
     // legacy 'system' rows self-heal to 'platform' on the next kernel:ready.
     const fields = { label: meta.label, description: meta.description, managed_by: 'platform' };
-    const existing = await tryFind(ql, 'sys_position', { name }, 1);
-    if (existing[0]?.id) {
-      if (await tryUpdate(ql, 'sys_position', { id: existing[0].id, ...fields })) updated += 1;
+    // Limit 5, not 1: a tenant-scoped read passes through `applyTenantScope`,
+    // whose compatibility arm returns organization-less rows alongside this
+    // organization's own. Asking for one row would hand back whichever the
+    // driver ordered first — and taking a pre-fix organization-less row as
+    // "already seeded" is exactly the silent no-op this pass must not perform.
+    const existing = await tryFind(ql, 'sys_position', { name }, 5, organizationId);
+    const { own, organizationLessResidue } = resolveOwnOrganizationRow(existing, organizationId);
+    if (organizationLessResidue) residue.push(name);
+    if (own?.id) {
+      // O(changed declarations): an unchanged row costs no write at all.
+      if (rowMatchesDeclaration(own, fields)) { unchanged += 1; continue; }
+      if (await tryUpdate(ql, 'sys_position', { id: own.id, ...fields }, organizationId)) updated += 1;
     } else {
       const created = await tryInsert(ql, 'sys_position', {
         id: genId('position'), name, ...fields, active: true, is_default: false,
-      });
+      }, organizationId);
       if (created) seeded += 1;
     }
   }
-  options.logger?.info?.('[security] built-in identity names + audience anchors seeded into sys_position', { seeded, updated, total: rows.length });
+  if (organizationId) {
+    warnPreFixOrganizationLessRows(options.logger, 'sys_position', residue, organizationId);
+  }
+  if (seeded + updated > 0) {
+    options.logger?.info?.('[security] built-in identity names + audience anchors seeded into sys_position', {
+      seeded, updated, unchanged, total: rows.length, ...(organizationId ? { organization: organizationId } : {}),
+    });
+  }
   return { seeded, updated };
 }