diff --git a/agent-computer/src/workspace.ts b/agent-computer/src/workspace.ts
index 4e06f09d..8aa9c602 100644
--- a/agent-computer/src/workspace.ts
+++ b/agent-computer/src/workspace.ts
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
  * can be tested against a temporary directory instead of being taken on trust.
  */
 import {
+  lstat,
   mkdir,
   readdir,
   readFile,
@@ -131,9 +132,29 @@ export function createWorkspace(
     }
     assertInside(root, realAnchor, wanted);
 
-    // For a write, return the full lexical target. It is already proven contained lexically, and the
-    // deepest existing directory is proven contained after symlinks, so `mkdir -p` can only create the
-    // rest inside the workspace.
+    // The last component, which the anchor above deliberately skipped.
+    //
+    // Resolving the directory proves where the write lands only while the name inside it is a name.
+    // If it is already a symlink, `writeFile` follows it and the bytes go wherever it points, so the
+    // link has to be resolved too. A dangling one is refused rather than resolved: it points at a
+    // file that does not exist yet, so there is nothing to check, and writing through it would
+    // create the file it names.
+    if (forWrite) {
+      const link = await lstat(target).catch(() => null);
+      if (link?.isSymbolicLink()) {
+        const realTarget = await realpath(target).catch(() => null);
+        if (!realTarget) {
+          throw new WorkspacePathError(
+            `${wanted} is a link to somewhere that does not exist, so it cannot be written through.`,
+          );
+        }
+        assertInside(root, realTarget, wanted);
+      }
+    }
+
+    // For a write, return the full lexical target. It is already proven contained lexically, the
+    // deepest existing directory is proven contained after symlinks, and a link at the end is proven
+    // to stay inside, so `mkdir -p` can only create the rest inside the workspace.
     return forWrite ? target : realAnchor;
   }
 
diff --git a/agent-computer/tests/workspace.test.ts b/agent-computer/tests/workspace.test.ts
index 47eb97fb..117c38a6 100644
--- a/agent-computer/tests/workspace.test.ts
+++ b/agent-computer/tests/workspace.test.ts
@@ -1,5 +1,12 @@
 import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, test } from "bun:test";
-import { mkdir, mkdtemp, rm, symlink, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import {
+  mkdir,
+  mkdtemp,
+  readFile,
+  rm,
+  symlink,
+  writeFile,
+} from "node:fs/promises";
 import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
 import { join } from "node:path";
 import {
@@ -206,6 +213,46 @@ describe("escaping the workspace", () => {
     );
   });
 
+  test("refuses to write THROUGH a symlink at the file itself", async () => {
+    // The directory a write lands in is resolved and the last component is not, so a link left where
+    // the file goes carries the bytes out. Nothing in this API makes one, which is the whole reason
+    // it is easy to miss: a shell session makes one, an archive a Bot unpacked carries one, and in a
+    // container shared between Bots the other Bot makes one.
+    const victim = join(outside, "victim.txt");
+    await writeFile(victim, "original", "utf8");
+    await symlink(victim, join(root, "notes.md"));
+
+    await expect(workspace().write("notes.md", "owned")).rejects.toThrow(
+      WorkspacePathError,
+    );
+    expect(await readFile(victim, "utf8")).toBe("original");
+  });
+
+  test("refuses to append THROUGH a symlink at the file itself", async () => {
+    // Append is the same door. It takes the same resolved path and differs only in the write flag.
+    const victim = join(outside, "victim.txt");
+    await writeFile(victim, "original", "utf8");
+    await symlink(victim, join(root, "log.txt"));
+
+    await expect(
+      workspace().write("log.txt", "owned", { append: true }),
+    ).rejects.toThrow(WorkspacePathError);
+    expect(await readFile(victim, "utf8")).toBe("original");
+  });
+
+  test("refuses to write THROUGH a symlink pointing at a file that does not exist yet", async () => {
+    // A dangling link resolves to nothing, so a check that asks where it points learns nothing and
+    // lets it past. Writing through one CREATES the file it names, which is the same escape with an
+    // extra step.
+    const victim = join(outside, "not-yet.txt");
+    await symlink(victim, join(root, "draft.txt"));
+
+    await expect(workspace().write("draft.txt", "owned")).rejects.toThrow(
+      WorkspacePathError,
+    );
+    expect(await readFile(victim, "utf8").catch(() => null)).toBe(null);
+  });
+
   test("a symlink pointing back INSIDE the workspace still works", async () => {
     // The guard must confine, not merely forbid symlinks: refusing every link would be easier and
     // would break legitimate use.
@@ -213,6 +260,11 @@ describe("escaping the workspace", () => {
     await ws.write("real/data.txt", "inside");
     await symlink(join(root, "real"), join(root, "alias"));
     expect((await ws.read("alias/data.txt")).text).toBe("inside");
+
+    // Writing through it too, because a guard that only forbids would pass the refusal tests above
+    // while breaking the thing links are legitimately for.
+    await ws.write("alias/data.txt", "still inside");
+    expect((await ws.read("real/data.txt")).text).toBe("still inside");
   });
 
   test("a sibling directory sharing the root's name prefix is still outside", async () => {